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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tim the Miller rule, and thus reaffirmed its past position. Since one can
not be certain what Young may stand for, the following conclusions
should be drawn:
1. Because the court has not seen fit to explicitly overrule Miller v.
Scarbrough," to file valid mortgages on shifting stocks, the attorney
must continue to follow the Miller requirements and include the requi-
site provisions within the mortgage itself.
2. The entire mortgage will be found invalid if the mortgagee fails in
his duty to see that the mortgagor complies with the mortgage terms,
whereas, in other types of financing, e.g., accounts receivable, mere loss
of collateral results.
3. It is still uncertain whether anything except business expenses
may be taken from the proceeds, although it appears that the court's
concept of what constitutes a business expense has broadened. 5
4. Although the court indicated that the accounting might be some-
thing less than a strict accounting, e.g., a business accounting geared to
each situation, it would be wise, to prevent future litigation on the
question of fraud, to continue the practice of strict accounting as in the
past.
It should be hoped that the future will hold more flexibility for inven-
tory financing. Recording statutes, credit ratings, and other procedures
are available to protect creditors. The court should continue to promote
inventory financing by discarding needless rules which hamper financ-
ing46 and should resolve the confusion caused by the contradictory posi-
tions stated in the Young case. However, until it does, a wait-and-see
attitude will be necessary. JOHN E. IVERSON
Priority-Federal Tax Liens and Future Advance Mortgages. In
American Surety Co. v. Sundberg' the Washington Supreme Court
44 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
4 5 In Young, for example, the court allowed the deduction of Young's personal living
expenses, which in this situation was necessary to the business because Young, who
devoted his entire time to the business, was unsalaried. U.S. Rubber's argument that,
under Income Tax definitions, personal expenses could not be business expenses did not
persuade the court. The court realized that in a sole proprietorship business-where
salaries are not usually received-it is to the creditor's benefit that the owner be able
to devote all his time to making profits rather than using part of it to earn income to
meet his personal expenses.
46 ,... the result is that one who extends credit to a merchandiser and attempts to
protect himself by a mortgage on a shifting stock of goods as security, iven though he
complies with the recording statutes, becomes an insurer of the mortgagor's perform-
ance of the contract. Such a liability would render the security valueless." United
States Rubber Co. v. Young, 57 Wn.2d 686, 689-90, 359 P.2d 315, 317 (1961).
'158 Wash. Dec. 335, 363 P.2d 99 (1961).
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made a startling encroachment upon the sanctity of a secured mortgage.
Using the United States Supreme Court's test of "choateness," 2 the
court held that the lien of a mortgage securing future advances is
subordinate to federal tax liens filed subsequent to the filing of the
mortgage, but prior to advances for which the lien was claimed.
In February, 1955, Oscar Sundberg & Sons, a partnership, entered
into a contract with Boeing Airplane Company to do certain painting.
American Surety Company entered into a performance bond in favor
of Boeing, which required the surety to complete or cause the contract
to be completed if the Sundbergs were unable to perform.
During the months of July and August, 1955, six advances totaling
over $35,000 were made by the surety. It was agreed that these
advances would be secured by mortgages on real property owned by
the individual partners. Three mortgages were recorded on property
in King County on July 20 of that year and a fourth was recorded in
Island County on July 21. These mortgages were similar in form,
stating that they were made in consideration of the advances already
made, two at that time, "and in consideration of further advances to be
made."' Additional payments were later advanced, and it was con-
ceded that the surety paid $163,316.75 to complete the contract.
Credits received on the contract left a deficit of $569.52 remaining
for which an action was initiated. The amount received on the contract
was credited to the first advances made; thus the unpaid balance was
all advanced on or after December 6, 1955.
October 26, 1955, the United States filed notice of a tax lien in the
King County auditor's office, and a similar notice was fied in Island
County February 17, 1959. Thus the United States claimed priority
in the sale of the mortgaged property in King County. The trial court
gave priority to the judgment secured by the surety and the United
States appealed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment below and recognized the priority of the federal tax liens.
In its analysis, the court concluded that the priority of the tax liens
was a question to be governed "by the rationale of those Federal cases
which held that the lien of a prior mortgage must be subordinated to
2 To enable determination of the priorities betveen federal liens and competing
liens the Supreme Court has developed a test of definiteness. This test requires a com-
peting lien to be specific as to identity of the lienor, to be certain as to the amount of
the lien, and to be definite as to the property to which it has attached before the com-
peting lien can acquire priority over a federal claim.
3 158 Wash. Dec. 335, 337, 363 P.2d 99, 101.
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Federal tax liens where the mortgage lien is inchoate at the time the
notice of the Federal tax lien is filed."'
The court agreed with the trial court's finding that under Washing-
ton law there would be no question that the mortgage lien would be
first in priority.' The propriety of determining priority of mortgages
to secure mandatory future advances by relation back to the date of
the mortgage is well established by authority.6 Moreover, the Wash-
ington court has exercised a liberal standard in determining whether
future advances are mandatory,' and there is no doubt that mandatory
advances are prior to intervening interests.8 A standard which will
enable a determination at the point of realization is the basic essential
of certainty.
The court in American Surety went on to say that the relative
priority of United States tax liens presented a federal question to be
determined by federal courts.' The United States Supreme Court's
three-fold test of "choateness" was then applied to the mortgage in
4 Id. at 346, 363 P.2d at 106. The court cites four cases in support of this compre-
hensive statement. United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960) (mortgagee's
claimed priority for payment of real estate taxes accruing after recording of federal
tax liens, and further claim for attorney's fee paid in protection of lien of the mort-
gage were held subordinate to federal lien) ; United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624(9th Cir. 1959) (delinquent taxes on mortgaged property paid by mortgagee after
federal tax liens were filed against mortgagor-taxpayer. Held: federal lien granted
priority over taxes so paid) ; United States v. Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio
1958) (mortgage given to secure payment for legal services entitled to priority for
those services rendered before recording of federal tax liens, but not as to those
thereafter rendered) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 194 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1959) (federal tax lien granted priority over voluntary payment by mortgagee of
local real estate taxes which accrued after recording of tax lien). With the exception
of Ringler, these cases involve fortuitous occurrences of local tax claims which serve
to frustrate their statement in support of the broad principle set out by the Wash-
ington court. Ringler itself is only one lower federal court decision, and at page 547
states that the Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the priority of a federal tax
lien and a mortgage under section 6323.
5 The trial court relied upon Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wn.2d 29, 116
P.2d 253 (1941); Carey v. Herrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 Pac. 190 (1928); Eltopia
Finance Co. v. Colley, 126 Wash. 554, 219 Pac. 24 (1923) ; Home Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688, 56 Pac. 940 (1899). On appeal the court recognizes these
authorities and further cites 4 PomEoY, EQUTrrY JURIsPRL-DENcE § 1199 (5th ed. 1941).
A statement on the Washington law is clearly set out in Comment, Future Advances
on Mortgages in Washington, 18 WAsir. L. Ray. 24 (1943).6 See cases and authorities cited note 5, supra.
7 Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A Coln-
parison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Conmzercial Code, Article 9,
29 WAsH. L. Rxv. 1, 32, 33 nu.39 & 40 (1954).8 Cedar v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co., 16 Wn.2d 652, 134 P.2d 437 (1943). See Note,
19 WASH. L. REv. 40 (1944).
9 Note, however, as stated by Judge Whittaker, dissenting in United States v.
R. F. Ball Construction Co., 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 384 (5th
Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 587, 593 (1958), that "although the relation
of a state-created right to federal laws for the collection of federal credits is a federal
question, the State's classification of state-created rights must be given weight. United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank . . . 340 U.S. at pages 49-50 . . ..
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question. The court reiterated the three elements of definiteness set
out by the Supreme Court in 1946.10 Thus, before the filing of the
notice for United States tax liens as required by section 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,11 a competing lien must be definite as
to identity of lienor, amount of the lien, and the property to which it
attaches, in order to take a preferred position over the tax lien.
The court relied heavily upon United States v. Ringler,"2 a decision
of a lower federal court which gave a recorded tax lien priority over a
mortgage to secure future advances. The court in Ringler had admitted
that the Supreme Court had not yet passed upon the specific question.
The Washington court recognized this limitation but reached the same
conclusion as the federal court.
American Surety is a case of first impression in Washington and few
similar cases have arisen in the country. It represents the recent trend
of aggressiveness displayed by the federal tax authorities in securing
the enforcement and priority of federal tax liens over claims of almost
every status. The recent attack on the heretofore privileged consensual
security is of considerable practical importance and has promoted
genuine concern in legal circles."3
Consensual lienors are among a limited group of lien holders which
has been extended special protection under existing revenue laws.'
Half a century ago this protection was virtually non-existent since
federal tax liens dated back to the time of assessment and took priority
10 Illinois ex. rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) (priority of United
States for federal insurance contribution taxes granted over lien of State of Illinois
for unemployment compensation taxes since the latter was not specific and perfected
when the notice of the federal lien was recorded). The Court states at page 375: "The
long established rule requires that the lien must be definite, and not merely ascertain-
able in the future by taking further steps, in at least three respects as of the crucial
time. These are: (1) the identity of the lienor, United States v. Knott . . . (2) the
amount of the lien, United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Co. . . . and (3) the
property to which it attaches, United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Co., supra;
United States v. State of Texas, supra; People of State of New York v. Maclay,
supra. It is not enough that the lienor has the power to bring these elements, or any
of them, down from broad generality to the earth of specific identity."
11 "(a) Invalidity of lien without notice.-Except as otherwise provided in sub-
section (c), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by
the Secretary or his delegate. .. "
12 See cases cited and comment thereon, supra note 4.
13 Myers, The Fall and Rise of the Security Interest, 6 PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1960, p.
60; Plumb, Federal Tax Liens: Proposed Revision of the Law, 45 A.B.A.J. 351
(1959); Plumb, Federal Tax Liens: Association-Sponsored Bills Reintroduced, 47
A.B.A.J. 455 (1961) ; and see particularly Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien
Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 247, 459 (1958), for a comprehensive study of this area.
Security for future advances is specifically discussed at pp. 495-96.
14 INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 6323.
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over claims of later good faith encumbrancers who were without knowl-
edge of the existence of these liens.' 5 In the light of United States v.
Snyder, 6 Congress in 1913 extended protection from this secret lien to
mortgagees, purchasers, and judgment creditors by requiring that a
notice of these taxes be filed before a tax lien could acquire priority
over the claims of these three classes." A pledgee was added to the
list in 1939.11 This principle is now embraced in the current law: "the
lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof
has been filed .... .19
Thus, for nearly fifty years, mortgagees have enjoyed at least the
advantage of freedom from this secret lien, but this period has also seen
the rise of a new doctrine in the Supreme Court for determining
priority between federal and competing liens. This doctrine has taken
the form of a test of definiteness, the germs of which originated in a
1929 decision2" and reached full maturity in Illinois ex rel. Gordon v.
Campbell.2 In order to defeat a federal priority the competing lien
must meet the three-fold test of identity, certainty, and definiteness. If
one of these elements is lacking, the federal claim gains priority.
Nevertheless, the usual recorded mortgage 2 still seemed insulated
from the impact of federal liens. The security of the mortgagee gener-
ally was not challenged by the Government, since the mortgagee en-
joyed the protected status under section 6323 whereby notice of a tax
lien had to be properly filed before it could be valid against him. In
recent decisions the federal courts have begun to encroach upon this
supposed sanctuary of consensual security. Applying the test of
"choateness" to a mortgage to secure future advances, the federal tax
authorities have argued successfully in at least one instance that the
amount of the lien was indefinite when the tax notice was filed. 2 The
Supreme Court has not yet decided this specific question, but the
'1 In United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893), the Supreme Court held that
an unrecorded tax lien was valid against a purchaser without notice thereof. See
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6321, 6322 for present law as to the time of attachment
of the tax lien.
16 Ibid.
17 Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
Is Act of June 29, 1939, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 882-83.
'9 IxT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (a).
20 Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).21Case and comment thereon, supra note 10. For an explanation of the develop-
ment in this area see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The
Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954).
22 See e.g., RCW 65.08 for typical recording statutes.2 8United States v. Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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Washington court in American Surety has chosen to follow the small
group of cases which apply the "choateness" test to mortgages without
attempting to distinguish them.2 Briefs filed on appeal pointed out
that grounds for distinction were found by the trial court. 5
The Washington court relies especially upon Ringler, and although
United States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co.26 is referred to, the court
fails to note its implication. The actual nine-line Supreme Court
opinion in Ball did not mention "mortgage" but referred to the docu-
ment in question merely as an "instrument." It is arguable that this
lack of expression indicates an unwillingness on the part of the
Supreme Court to pronounce so harsh a result." To this extent then
Ringler could have been discredited-the Ohio federal district court
had "assumed"2 a more definitive decision by the Supreme Court than
actually was rendered when the question presented itself in Ball.
The Washington lender on a mortgage to secure future advances
24 Cases cited supra note 4.
25 Brief for Appellant, pp. 25-27. See also Brief for Respondent, pp. 6-8. Ringler,
however, is not noted.
20140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 239 F2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd per
curian, 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (claim of a surety who was a mortgagee under state
law held subordinate to unrecorded tax lien. Court said the "instrument!' involved was
inchoate and unperfected so that section 6323's provisions did not apply). The Ball
case has provoked sharp criticism as an unprecendented attack on consensual security.
Myers, mupra note 13; AmucA BAR AssocAT ON, FxnAL REPORT OF THE COM-
MxTTE oN FnmEm LiENs, 3, 4, 14-16, 86-89 (1959); Note, 10 ALA. L. Rxv. 462
(1958); Note, 27 FORDHAu L. REv. 284 (1958); Note, 33 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 157
(1958). It appears that the Supreme Court has mitigated the implications of this
extreme position in a later decision. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960)
(federal tax liens were effectively extinguished by state proceedings to which the
Government was not a party). However, the Bromnan case was not noted by the
Washington court since analogous state proceedings were not involved in American
Surety. It is mentioned here to illustrate the effect of personalities on the Supreme
Court Bench; since both Ball and Bromsan were 5-to-4 decisions the certainty in
this area of law is jeopardized.
27As pointed out by the lengthy dissent in Ball, there was no question but that
the "instrument!' in issue was a mortgage under the Texas law. As stated by Myers,
supra note 13, at 62, "Ball suffered many factual idiosyncrasies. As such it is possible
to limit the case to its facts and negate the implications . . . " Speaking of Ball, the
dissenting opinion in United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 850 (4th Cir. 1960) states,
"The very fact that the views of the majority were unelaborated in their summary
disposition of the issue suggests an absence of an intention to effect a novel extension
of a particular rule devised to meet dissimilar conditions. One would suppose that,
had the majority intended to decide an important question never before considered by
the Supreme Court, it would have stated the considerations which led to its resolution
of the issue. It seems more likely than not that the majority in Ball Construction
were of the opinion that the assignee was not a mortgagee within the meaning of
the statute."
28 United States v. Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544, 547 (N.D. Ohio 1958), states, "The
Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the question involving the relative priority
of a tax lien and a mortgage under Section 3672 where the tax lien was filed sub-
sequent to the recording of a mortgage given to secure future advances. But the
court's uniform policy of applying the doctrine of 'the inchoate lien' in cases involving
tax liens and judgment liens under Section 3672 seems clearly to forecast a similarly
19621
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now finds himself in an unenviable position. Prior to American Surety,
contracts which required mandatory future advances had been fully
protected by the relation back doctrine. This was a sensible result,
since under such a contract the extension of future advances is an
obligation; the mortgagee has no means of protecting himself against
fortuitous events which may occur requiring him to fulfill this mandate.
Moreover, it is commonly true of all future advance transactions that
it will be essential to the lender's own security to complete the advances
contemplated. Future advances become necessary to protect the pre-
vious loans and advances made. To grant a tax lien filed after such a
mortgage is recorded priority over the advances not then made, but
obligatory by contract or necessity upon the lender, is in all respects
an unjust result. Further, in light of the purported protection extended
by section 6323 such a result seems unreconcilable.
However this may be, there is no doubt that American Surety has
dictated that in the future the consensual security holder's position in
Washington will be a defensive one. Whether the court will retreat
from this extreme position remains to be seen, but until it does the
Washington attorney will have to take precautionary steps in coun-
seling his lender client. One author has suggested drawing up two
mortgages. After-acquired property may not be saved, he states, but
the lender will be able to secure specific perfection of the basic security
in return for the basic loan.29
The few decisions of which American Surety is representative have
stimulated a state of confusion in the consensual security area. The
purpose of the federal tax authorities is avowedly to enforce the exist-
ing tax statutes to the end of securing the greatest possible revenue
benefits. There is no indication of the point at which this aggressive-
ness will abate. In the light of these facts the American Bar Associa-
tion has adopted a Proposed Statute to rectify the areas of indecision
and doubt existing in the present Revenue Code.30 Under this Proposed
strict application of the doctrine in future cases involving the relative priority of
United States tax liens and mortgages. It is safe to assume that in such a case the
three-fold test of choateness . . . will be applied to determine whether a prior recorded
mortgage is a perfected lien entitled to priority." (Emphasis added.) Note that section
3672 referred to is the same as section 6323 in the current Code.
29 Myers, supra note 13 at 64. He continues, "subsequent specific mortgages for
subsequent present 'future advances' and present 'after-acquired' property can be
drawn. So long as these are properly executed prior to assessment of a tax lien, the
security will be good." Later the author advises that foreclosure and sale may be the
best route for some creditors. Id. at 69.
3) See Amxmacm BAR AsSOCIATIox, FINAL REPORT OF THE CommITEE oN FEDERAL
LIENS, 65, 121, 127 (1959). This A.B.A. sponsored statute has twice been introduced
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Statute consensual security will again be returned to its protected
status.8 Until then it is only possible to conclude that American Surety
has enabled the federal tax lien to become a more menacing threat in
the federal tax authorities' arsenal of weapons. Inherent in this deci-
sion is a more basic threat to the security of business transactions.
While the decline and possible destruction of the security interest is
only a remote possibility, reality dictates that credit will become avail-
able only on more onerous terms. After half a century of slumber,
perhaps it is time for Congress to re-establish protection for consensual
security. BEVERLY J. RoSENOW
Survival of Mortgage-lien on Conditional Vendees Interest Fol-
lowing Declaration of Forfeiture. In Norlin v. Montgomery1 the
Washington court (1) held that a mortgagee of the vendee's interest
under a forfeitable real estate contract has a lien on the equity of the
vendee, and (2) implied that the lien survives a default by the vendee
and a subsequent declaration of forfeiture by the vendor.
As vendee, defendant Montgomery entered a forfeitable real-estate
contract with Schy, the vendor. Vendee Montgomery then mortgaged
his equity in the contract to plaintiff-mortgagee Norlin who then re-
corded the mortgage. Thereafter, defendant Palmer purchased the
property from Schy and later loaned $1,500 to vendee Montgomery,
adding that amount to the real-estate contract payment schedule by
endorsement. Then vendee Montgomery defaulted, and Palmer gave
written notice of forfeiture. Montgomery executed a quitclaim deed to
Palmer with a provision which stated that the intention of the deed was
to cancel the contract. Mortgagee Norlin then offered to take over the
original Schy-Montgomery contract and to continue the original pay-
ment schedule not including the loan of $1,500. After Palmer refused
this offer, Norlin brought an action to foreclose his mortgage, and
Palmer filed a cross-complaint to quiet titie.
Ignoring the issue of Palmer's declaration of forfeiture, the court
held:
in Congress: H.R. 7914, H.R. 7915, S. 2305, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), and H.R.
4319, H.R. 4320, S. 1193, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See explanation by Plumb,
supra note 13.
31 Security for obligatory, by contract or by necessity, future advances would be
entitled unconditionally to the same priority enjoyed under state law. The standard
of "choateness" would not be applied. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 30, at 65-67,
86-89.
1159 Wash. Dec. 280, 367 P.2d 621 (1961).
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